







European Sugar Regime

British Society of Sugar Technologists, 16 April 2013

Gerald Mason

Vice President, EU Affairs & Strategy

email gerald.mason@tateandlylesugars.com

London 0044 (0) 207 540 6625

Brussels 0032 (0) 2791 7680







Reminder of what is in place today

What is broken

Proposals on the table

Process to agreement

Impact of an agreement











REMINDER (1)

Beet 13.3M tonnes


Isoglucose 0.69M tonnes

Out of Quota 5.3M tonnes in 2012/13

Certain uses for OOQ sugar

- Exports
- Ethanol
- Chemical Industry

Any other use subject to €500 per tonne levy









REMINDER (2)

Import duties bound under WTO rules


Fixed at €339 for raw and €419 for white sugar

Supplementary variable duty currently suspended

Preferential imports policed by strict import licensing

Tool 2 - Import Duties













BROKEN (1)

EPA / EBA imports forecast at 3.5M tonnes by EC

All of this volume was to be free of import duty


Gap 1.4M tonnes between forecast and actual in 2011/12

Gap finally made good by

- i) Increasing beet quotas
- ii) Tax auctions for extra imports

EPA / EBA forecast and actual sugar imports to the EU





■ 2006 Forecast of EPA and EBA imports on which policy was based (1)■ Actual EPA and EBA imports

(1) The forecast volumes were in Council Document 11255/05 of 2005.











BROKEN (2)


Commission allowed new entrants to refining from 2009/10 based on forecast increase in cane supply

Beet companies built cane refineries as

- i) Their beet quota fell
- ii) The beet industry was given €5 billion of aid to compensate

EU cane refining capacity

Million tonnes WSE per sugar marketing year



Source. Tale & Lyle Sugar









BROKEN (3)

Capacity utilisation fallen to around 60%

This is because the Commission has:

DEMAND

Allowed beet processors to move in to cane refining


SUPPLY

Failed to ensure duty free imports reach the target on which the policy change to open up demand was based

Some of the limited sugar available for refiners has been at very high or full import duty

Cane Refining Capacity Utilisation

% per sugar marketing year





Duty free and CXL raw sugar



Tax auction and full duty raw sugar












BROKEN (4)

Cane refiners costs forced up by

- i) Tax auctions
- ii) Crosscontamination of duty-free raw sugar cost
- iii) Higher unit manufacturing cost due to low capacity utilisation

The broken EU sugar market Economic theory representation











OUTPUT

BROKEN (5)

Result is obvious

Majority of industry is beet and do not face this cost

They are able to price up to the cane refiners costs

Result

- i) Windfall profits for beet industry
- ii) Cane refiners competitiveness artificially surpressed



DEMAND









BROKEN (6)

EU sugar prices 80% above world market

Prices continue to diverge


Reason?

Response to shortage has been

- Delayed
- Ad-hoc
- Focused on politics, not the problem

The broken EU sugar market

€ per tonne CIF EU (world) or ex-works (EU)











Proposals for post-2015 Sugar Regime

	European Commission Oct 2011 publication	EP Agri Committee Jan 2013 vote	European Council
Quotas	Quotas lapse	Quotas stayQuotas given back to some countries	Quotas stay until end-September 2017
Import Duties and measures	 Import duties remain No mechanism to automatically make good preferential cane sugar shortages 	 Import duties remain No mechanism to automatically make good preferential cane sugar shortages 	 Import duties remain No mechanism to automatically make good preferential cane sugar shortages
Market Management	❖ None	 Beet quota and import increase in event of shortage But imports nullified by 3M tonnes clause 	❖ None







PROCESS

Some key differences this time

27 Member States

Co-decision with European Parliament

Sugar part of much wider CAP debate



European Commission

Member States

- Trilogue negotiations
- Cover whole of CAP
- 30 meetings until 27 June 2013
 - Key issues for sugar
 - End date for quotas
 - Countries that want quota back
 - Role of imports and cane refiners







Concentration in the European Sugar Market


% of EU-27 sugar production from beet and cane

IMPACT

Market already highly concentrated

Commission, EP and Council Proposals will both increase concentration

Increases potential for "tacit collusion" at best, actual collusion at worst



Source: Tate & Lyle Sugars company estimates







Will the Proposals fix the broken EU sugar market?

€ per tonne CIF EU (world) or ex-works (EU)


IMPACT

Will it fix the broken market?

No

It will increase concentration

Increased
likelihood of
operating at or
near full duty
import price











Quotas stay Import duties stay Quotas go Import duties go






Quotas go Import duties stay Quotas stay Import duties go



















- Key tools QUOTAS and IMPORT DUTIES
- Current proposals are HIGHLY ASYMETRICAL
- High risk of uncompetitive outcome
- SYMETRY needed between the 2
- Not asking for perfection
- But ASYMETRICAL treatment will mean
 - No independent cane refiners
 - Increasingly concentrated EU sugar market
 - Even less chance of competition and choice















European Sugar Regime

British Society of Sugar Technologists, 16 April 2013

Gerald Mason

Vice President, EU Affairs & Strategy

email gerald.mason@tateandlylesugars.com

London 0044 (0) 207 540 6625

Brussels 0032 (0) 2791 7680